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Abstract: In light of the current events, namely the crisis that economy has to face for quite some 
years now, plenty of questions are raised, not only among specialists in the field but also among 
ordinary people as they prove to be most impoverished by these imbalances. Thus, this paper aims, as 
a first objective, to explain, from a general perspective and using an inductive-subjective 
methodology based on a brief survey as well as on observation, two of the most important causes that, 
according to the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, are the leading motives for triggering crises. We 
are referring particularly to an excessive state interventionism manifested throughout its 
expansionary monetary policy. Secondly, we seek to establish the interconnections between these 
elements and the case of the Great Depression as well as the current recession. The results we came 
across point out towards the same pattern designed by the Austrian economists, although the 
circumstances are, each time, different. Hence, the contribution of this paper consists of handling the 
details that surround the subject by extracting only the essential aspects regarding the triggering of 
crises; we refer to the main ideas that need to be underlined for a better comprehension of the topic. 
Keywords: Austrian School; crisis; business cycle; Great Depression. 
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1. Introduction 
„The great inflations of our age are not acts of God. They are man-made or, to say 
it bluntly, government-made. They are the offshoots of doctrines that ascribe to 
governments the magic power of creating wealth out of nothing and of making 
people happy by raising the “national income.” (Mises, 1953, p. 1) 
We chose to use a quote from Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit as a starting 
point for our analysis because we consider it to be quite relevant when trying to 
synthesize the general Austrian point of view regarding the triggering of crises. 
Hence, the economic imbalances contain precious information that, if used 
properly, is able to lead the way towards prosperity. From this point of view, crises 
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should be viewed as meaningful lessons. They manage to reveal significant clues 
regarding the crucial aspects of an imbalance and how to overcome them, in the 
future. Unfortunately, these relevant details are neglected or ignored. Once the 
crisis vanishes, the triggering causes are as good as forgotten, therefore, the 
measures that would help avoid further imbalances are completely abandoned. It 
seems as if only quite a few have eyes to actually observe and subsequently preach 
them.  
Nevertheless, it is quite certain that every crisis is different and, without any doubt, 
every time we have to deal with new, challenging and persistent factors. However, 
the pattern is, in most cases, the same although the circumstances could be and, in 
most cases, are, indeed, different. This skeleton dresses each time new clothes, 
under the form of various factors, which determine the particularity of every 
situation. Just as on the operating table of a surgeon are placed various tools which 
will be used during the procedure, from the same chain of ideas, we can talk about 
the case of economists who use certain economic indicators, which take the place 
of the medical utensils, to analyze and determine the disease known under the 
name of crises. To this analogy we could add the experience, as well as the 
particular type of work embraced by every doctor who, most certainly, differs from 
the others from his branch. Thus, the economic tools used for operating and 
recovering the economic apparatus differ from one doctrine to the other. The 
present “operation” finds its path under the aegis of the Austrian School of 
economics, more specifically, it is accomplished through the vision of the Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory. Although, philosophically speaking, we breathe the same 
economic air, the key answer stands in the perspective from which we analyze the 
situation. 
The particularity of their approach manifested through a totally different manner 
regarding the onset of crises, altogether with the recommended therapeutics, a 
point of view which carries a distinct mark compared with the one chosen by most 
of the mainstream economists nowadays, led us to deciding upon this topic. Our 
first preoccupation, the case of the 1929-1933 crisis is, without any doubt, a 
particular one as it is the most violent of its kind. Although the phenomenon that 
unleashed itself during that period is a very complex one and it determined 
economists all over the world to unbury the past and develop complex studies in 
order to find precise answers, the inflicts are countless and it is quite difficult to 
determine an accurate ongoing of the events. The same problematic stands upon 
nowadays economic issues. Thus, it determined us to try and answer, as clearly and 
simply
1
 as possible, to the following questions: Under which circumstances did the 
economists belonging to the Austrian School, particularly the deans Ludwig von 
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only to specialist but to ordinary people as well; their understanding of the situation is crucial and 
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Mises and Friedrich August Hayek, managed to observe the clues and launch 
warning signals before the actual triggering of the Great Depression started? And, 
to what extent did the contemporary Austrian economists follow the path marked 
by their predecessors considering the foreseeing of the current events? 
For someone who understands how a healthy economic mechanism should 
function and who, under these given conditions, masters a rather well 
developed spirit of observation it is easy to solve the puzzle containing the 
direction towards which to tip the balance. The hints that predicted the 1929 
depression as well as the 2007 - present recession were, in the opinion of 
Austrian economists, quite obvious and revealed themselves particularly 
under the form of two important elements.  
The first clue is related to the expansionist monetary policy that led to a 
deterioration of credit and brought a high level of inflation. The second sign 
derives from the implementation of a series of protectionist measures or, in other 
words, the embrace of excessive state interventionism.  
 
2. Predictions, Then Crisis 
It is now a wider and wider accepted the fact that two of the most influential 
economists of their times who truly managed to foresee the 1929 crisis were part of 
the Austrian School of Economics. While Irving Fischer and John Maynard Keynes 
were overflowing with optimism, arguing that global economy is flourishing, 
Mises and Hayek were the ones who were launching alarm signals, warning that 
U.S. economy is on the verge of a big collapse. Therefore, in the late 1920s, Mises 
(1953, 2006) was convinced that a crisis is lurking just around the corner. His 
conviction was drawn from the fact that U.S. economy had known a series of 
technological innovations that increased productivity and thus turned into an 
expanding supply of consumer goods, a rising stock market and a massive real 
estate boom; and all this was happening while prices roses by 2% per year. In his 
opinion, it was undoubtedly the hands of Central Banks maneuvering the reins of 
monetary policy
1
. Meanwhile, Mises realized that the credit expansion, performed 
abusively during that period, would lead sooner or later to an economic disaster: 
“The economic consequences of credit expansion are due to the fact that it distorts 
one of the items of the speculator’s and investor’s calculation, namely, interest 
rates.  He who does not see through this, falls victim to an illusion; his plans turn 
out wrong because they were based on falsified data.  Nothing but a perfect 
familiarity with economic theory and a careful scrutiny of current monetary and 
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credit phenomena can save a man from being deceived and lured into 
malinvestments” (Mises, 1953, pp. 251-252). 
 The Misesian perspective is, from certain points of view, different from the 
Hayekian one. However, we will not insist upon this particular aspect as it does not 
represent the focus point of our research. The significant part consist of the fact 
that both of them manage to submit, quite clearly, the mechanism through which 
monetary expansion, accompanied by loans that exceed the rate of voluntary 
saving, can determine a misallocation of resources, particularly affecting the 
structure of capital.  
According to Hayek (1931, 1933), when the quantity of money is increased, the 
new money is injected in some particular way, either via Central Banks through 
freshly printed money or via Commercial Banks through the channel of fractional 
reserves system, actions which temporarily distort relative prices causing the price 
system to communicate false information about consumer preferences and resource 
availabilities. Hayek also showed, along his research, that money-induced 
movements in the interest rate prove to affect the capital structure. The cluster of 
these circumstances would eventually lead to an economic collapse. His theory is 
rather complex and detailed and it does not represent the purpose of this paper as it 
deserves a separate approach. 
For Mises and Hayek, the trade cycle theory was an attempt to integrate an 
understanding of a complex capital structure into a monetary exchange economy 
(Boettke, 2001, p. 34). Nevertheless, a very brief representation of the mechanism 
elaborated by the Austrian economists would look like this: State -> FED -> 
Commercial Banks -> Capitalists -> Erroneous Investment -> Depression.
1
  
The general pattern that sprung under the form of the already mentioned 
interventionist monetary policy can fit the present recession as well. The crisis 
erupted when the U.S. real estate bubble exploded in 2007. Commercial banks, 
hungry for maximizing their profits, began to give „identity card only” credit (to 
use the Romanian version) to customers who were not capable of carrying such a 
credit. Thus, a large number of subprime loans
2
 were launched, most of them 
having a mortgage nature. We are referring to those types of loans that bared a high 
degree of risk as they were granted without any warranty and a prior verification of 
their worthiness. This cheap currency, once launched on the market, led to a boom 
in the real estate, encouraging the „trend” of having more properties than can be 
occupied. Looking from an aggregate perspective, lax standards for approving 
loans, the initial beneficial terms and the long-term projections of growth in the 
real estate sector were the factors that determined the bubble burst. Housing prices 
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2 Subprime loans are the type of loans given to people who either have a repayment history, or have 
poor financial possibilities, in terms of conventional banks. 
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recorded a noteworthy increase between 1997-2006, particularly an increase of 
124%. Compared with the average annual income, the average price of housing 
increased approximately from 3 to 4,6 times more in 2006. High-risk mortgage 
loans (the subprime) increased from 5% in 1994 to 20% in 2006. The use of new 
types of loans, the so called NINJA (No Income No Job No Assets) had led to real 
problems. As a consequence of the real estate bubble burst, all those who were 
drawn into investing in this sector have suffered enormously. The panic signs 
determined financial institutions to realize the subprime mortgage loses and tried to 
follow a series of recovery measures. But it was already too late. 
Not many alarm signals were launched before 2006 as there were quite a few who 
benefited from the situation. However, before the onset of the crisis, Shostak 
(2003) was launching a rather rhetorical question whether the housing bubble that 
was forming during that period might be considered a myth or a reality. As a 
continuation, Mayer (2003) further developed the housing bubble problematic, 
exposing the grave situation towards which the economy was heading. The data 
analysis comes to support their arguments.  
Further, White (2006, p. 1) pointed out that “…persistently easy monetary 
conditions can lead to the cumulative build-up over time of significant deviations 
from historical norms—whether in terms of debt levels, saving ratios, asset prices 
or other indicators of ‘imbalances.” White is followed by other Austrian 
economists, like Taylor (2007) or Reisman (2007) who discover and further 
explained the mechanism behind the triggering of crises, with particular interest on 





Figure 1. Austrian Business Cycle 
Source: own creation 
Therefore, the main problem that determined the triggering of the studied crises, 
the key element, was undoubtedly artificial credit expansion. Why is it named 
artificial? What does this expansion basically entails? The explanation is rather 
simple and easy to follow.  
 
3. The Answer: Austrian Business Cycle 
Artificial credit expansion is considered to be an artificial one as it doesn’t have a 
correspondent increase in the voluntary savings of population. Doubtless, in a 
healthy economic environment investment is financed out of loans granted by 
banks and based on the resources drawn from citizen’s voluntary savings. We are 
referring to the term deposits, meaning the money that population is willing to give 
up, temporarily and consciously, in exchange for the benefits arising from interest. 
By granting credits out of resources that are part of demand deposits, interest rate, a 
true market signal, is going below its natural and normal value. Therefore 
entrepreneurs have to face distorted information about consumer preferences 
related both to consumption and to the action of saving. Consequently, we can 
admit, without any doubt, the fact that this leads to erroneous investment which 
eventually prove unprofitable and mark the way towards massive unemployment 
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Our first focus represents the twenties, or better known as the Roaring Twenties
2
, a  
period that can best be described as the time when the United States embarked on 
the vessel of progress and innovation. This was the time when the impetuous 
started to unleash itself; it was the pre-crisis phase that lasted roughly eight years. 
The blame for the great number of investment errors can be casted upon the 
expansionary monetary policy supported by the FED during the 1920s. The cluster 
of failed entrepreneurship plans as well as the elaborated bailout system brought 
upon the worst crisis that the XX
th
 century came to know. The first and most 
relevant period for our hypothesis is 1921-1925. That is, most certainly, when the 
highest amount of injections took place as the level of commercial bank inflation 
increased with over 37% in money supply, precisely $6.9 billion. The years 1925-
1929 revealed a lower level of inflation, when compared to the previous period, but 
it can still be view as a significant perturbation as it provided an increase of 15.3%, 
meaning $3.9 billion in money supply. The origins of these substantial injections 
were laid by the increase in total reserves which registered an augmentation of 
35.6% in the 1921-1925 period and of 8.7% between 1925-1929. The discrepancy 
was due to an augmentation from 11.7:1 to 12.5:1 in the reserve ratio which, 
consequently, determined the creation of several dollars in deposits corresponding 
to every dollar held as a reserve.
3
  
Having a constant fear of deflation, which was considered as an enormous 
impediment on the path that was leading towards industrial development and, 
nevertheless, economic progress, casted a veil upon Coolidge’s’, Hoover’s and 
then Roosevelt’s’ eyes, urging them to take the economic reins and to guide them 
towards a higher amount of involvement manifested through a lowering of the level 
of interest rates below their natural values (Robbins, 1934). Thereby, by 
maintaining a depreciated level of the refinancing rate, FED borrowed massively 
during the twenties, continuously feeding the impetuous of inflation and not of 
prosperity as they thought they would. Without any doubt, the first answers 
regarding the recognition of the triggering of crises come from FED and its 
functioning mechanism. However, the most consistent ones can be found if we dig 
the commercial banks underneath’s; and here we place a significant accent on how 
they manage to juggle with the two totally different types of deposits, the time and 
demand ones. These jugglers are viewed as primarily responsible for the massive 
monetary inflation of the 1920s (White, 2010). The explanation is rather simple as 
it comes from the required reserve ceiling. Hence, while demand deposits required 
a reserve of 10%, time deposits claimed only 3%. Consequently, while demand 
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deposits increased by only 30.8% during 1921-1929, time deposits grew double in 
value by no more and no less than 72.3% (Rothbard, 1972, p. 99).  
From this first main cause that we described above derives implicitly a second one. 
Both are tightly related and might be considered as one and the same as the 
expansionist procedure derives from the state involvement, it is recommended to 
discuss them separately. Hence, according to the business cycle theory, a 
hypothesis first formulated by Mises and then upgraded by Hayek, crises like the 
1929 one cannot be caused by individual trading decisions, but they stay in the 
shadow of Central Bank (in the case of U.S. we are referring to the FED) action to 
issue money without coverage. 
There is one important aspect that we should strongly take into consideration, an 
issue that is still raising numerous questions, namely the level of governmental 
interventionism during the 1920s period. The same problem keeps economy in 
chains nowadays also. It has been proven that, during the period of the Great 
Depression, this level reached high quotas, higher than before. One of the proofs is 
the fact that a special governmental agency had been created precisely to prevent 
crises or other associated problems such as for example banking panics. This 
agency we are talking about is the Federal Reserve Board (FED) and it had and still 
has the role of lender of last resort for banks. Its main purpose was therefore to 
prevent collapses and “save” the economy from recessions. However, Austrian 
economists manage to reveal how its role proved to be the exact opposite as: 
„Before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, national banks were not 
legally permitted to pay interest on time deposits, and so this category was 
confined to the less important state banks and savings banks. The Federal Reserve 
Act permitted the national banks to pay interest on time deposits. Moreover, before 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System, banks had been required to keep the 
same minimum reserve against time as against demand deposits. While the Federal 
Reserve Act cut the required reserve ratio roughly in half, it reduced required 
reserves against time deposits to 5 percent and, in 1917, to 3 percent.” (Rothbard, 
1972, p. 100). Therefore, according to Austrian School economists, namely 
Rothbard (1972), Robbins (1934), White (2010) and Smiley (2008), the evil 
unleashed itself once the invention of FED took place.
1
 
The reason for the boom and the inevitable depression was due to the monetary 
policy played by FED before and after 1929. Under the influence of some 
economists, including Irving Fisher, the FED sought stabilization of the general 
price level on the ground that both inflation and deflation were harmful. Given the 
expansion of goods and services during the Roaring Twenties, the level of prices 
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value of the dollar declined around 98% and that the blame should not fall on the shoulders of the 
market but on the ones belonging to the central bank, whose institutional logic carries it on an 
inflationary wave of counterfeit money.  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                          Vol 9, no. 1/2013 
 
 176 
was expected to decline slowly, and this would have probably happened if it 
weren’t for FEDs intervention in such a complex system called economic 
mechanism. 
The cause that determined the authorities to pump additional amounts of money 
and credit in the market, thus leading to a monetary expansion, was clearly the 
thought that the decline in prices might be a sign of “bad”1 deflation. The intention 
was seeking to prevent prices from falling. The problem was that it wasn’t the case 
to adopt those measures as the falling prices were a simple consequence of the fast 
development of economy. Therefore, under these circumstances, the results were 
disastrous. Hence, banks were able to lend the newly baked money by lowering 
interest rates below what Austrian economists call their natural, wicksellian
2
 level. 
Since the monetary expansion prevented prices from falling, no inflation appeared 
to be harmful. Therefore, the extent of monetary inflation was well hidden by the 
apparently stable level of prices. However, the distorted investment and the 
savings-investment imbalance were as real as possible.  
By the late 1928 and the early 1929, FED had eventually woken up from its 
beautiful dream and displayed concern regarding the fact that its expansionist 
monetary policy was threatening a significant increase in the price level. Along 
with that came the fear concerning the collapse of the currency, an immediate 
consequence of an ill economy which was fed with hyperinflation. Monetary 
breaks were finally pulled and by the end of 1929 the stock, investment and real 
estate markets went down the drain, one after another. The real crisis had begun. 
What can be inferred from the ideas mentioned above is that the magnitude of 
crises can be predicted by monitoring the level of inflation through the involvement 
of central and commercial banks; the former operates with interest rates while the 
latter uses both the time and demand deposits under the same basis. These are the 
leading anticipative methods known and used by Austrian economists, the ones that 
have been used, as well, by Mises and Hayek to foresee the Great Depression. 
Following the same pattern, inside the current economic events, the main 
accusation brought by the Austrian economists is linked to the action of artificial 
credit expansion. The many investment errors that caused the current crisis sprang 
from the monetary expansion that took place during the tenure of Alan Greenspan 
                                                        
1 According to their oppinion, the deflation is a real threat to the industries as a low price level is not 
able to support the production process by giving entrepreneurs their anticipated profit.  
2 The idea behind the equilibrium interest rate was advanced by the Swedish economist Knut 
Wicksell who argued that an increase in the normal price level had their origins in an excessive 
increases in the monetary base. Through the natural rate concept, his purpose became to clearify the 
mechanism behind the expansionist maneuvres as well as to disentangle the root of the conections 
between the monetary base, banks’ credit expansion, aggregate demand, and inflation. Wicksell based 





at the Fed. The old fear concerning the prospect of a possible deflation, following 
the bust of “dot.com” from 2000 and the events that took place on September 9, 
2001, determined the Fed to revive the credit decision through a series of interest 
rate cuts in the interbank market, cuts that have gone from 6.5% in November 2000 
and arrived in July 2003 to 1%. This incredibly small amount remained at the same 
value for approximately one year, until June 2004 (Reisman, 2007). 
The latest events seem to prove, one again, that the history really does repeat itself 
and that the consequences are increasingly wider, pressing heavily on the shoulders 
of the economy. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Admitting that it is hard to distinguish booms from sustainable growth, our 
research tried to provide a helping hand under the form of a better understanding of 
the separation between these two phases of economy; we pointed towards the 
evolution of two of the most powerful crises that economy had to face: the Great 
Depression and the Great Recession. 
Expansion and excessive interventionism; these are the two words that can 
synthesize and characterize, in light of the Austrian point of view, the triggering of 
the 1929-1933 plus the 2007-present crises. Presented in a simplistic yet 
comprehensive manner, these are the Austrian hints that could have helped prevent 
or, at least, diminish the harmful and destructive effects of what we consider to be 
two of the most violent crisis of the XX, respectively the XXI century. These are 
the indicators that have raised numerous question marks, firstly, among both Mises 
and Hayek and secondly among contemporary Austrian economists, determined 
them to launch signals about the hazardous state in which the economy was 
heading towards. 
When economy meets a powerful impetus people embark on an optimistic ship, 
without even considering seeking its true nature or the triggering causes of the 
boom that is forming under their eyes. During these precise moments Austrian 
economists are the only pessimist ones. When crises occur roles are reversed as 
people become worried while the Austrians become optimistic. At a first glance, 
this seems like a completely absurd approach. However, Austrian economists rush 
to give this statement a sense as their explanations sustain the fact that the crisis 
represents a natural way of correcting the errors that economy encountered up until 
then, a path that leads towards recovery and the healing of an economic system 
which has been suffering from a grinding disease. The recession is, therefore, the 
needed treatment; and sometimes medicine tastes bad but one still has to swallow it 
in order to get better. 
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Although more than 80 years have passed since the triggering of the Great 
Depression, the events that shook the pillions of the economic structure are still 
raising various problems and generating controversy. The last crisis that the 
economic apparatus had to endure since 2007 was, in many ways, similar to the 
one in 1929, therefore this can only mean the refusal to learn the obvious lessons 
that history could have tough during the years. The Austrian School, through their 
Business Cycle Theory, embrace the hypothesis that the more intervention 
economy has to face the worst the scenario of the recession will be and truly 
consider that a free-banking system, without the bailing central bank and with the 
commercial banks working based on the 100% reserve system might actually do 
the trick
1
. Less debt and more savings were crucial back in 1930s as they are 
nowadays. Although accused by most economists who pull up the sleeves and 
think they are giving a helping hand to cure the disease, Austrian economists, 
guided by the leading views of Mises and Hayek, prefer not to react to the ongoing 
of a depression as they truly believe in self-regulated markets. The free markets, 
and only them, are able to coordinate the connection between time and interest, 
such an important aspect for further economic development.  By choosing to get 
involved, the majority ceases to see their actual leading towards creating the 
problems and not solving them. Hence, the healing mechanism suggested by its 
representative figures, especially the one proposed in a very detailed manner by 
Jesus Huerta de Soto in his treatise Money, Credit and Business Cycle must not be 
neglected: “The solution lies in the following: the privatization of money and the 
introduction of a rigid monetary system such as the pure gold standard; the 
establishment of a 100% reserve requirement on demand deposits, as with any 
other deposit of a fungible good, such as wheat or oil; and the elimination of 
central banks, which in modern market economies are the only socialist planning 
agencies in the monetary sphere that remain operative.” (Huerta de Soto, 2010, p. 
782) 
Austrian economists strongly believe in their reform
2
 and are completely aware of 
the tragedy that lies underneath the line of events that are affecting the economy. 
Among the already mentioned series of causes that bear the guilt of economic 
imbalances, they are convinced that a very important yet tragic part is actually the 
lack of veracious information. Understanding the true causes that are leading to the 
triggering of crises might represent a real solution. 
                                                        
1 See Huerta de Soto (2010). 
2 Austrians believe in their approach and propose a fundamental reform of economic environment. 
The Misesian perspective convokes the return to the 100% gold standard as well as the renunciation 
of fractional-reserve commercial banking and the abolition of the central bank, while Hayekians 
advocate a system where consumers reign as they are able to choose the currency, from a variety of 




The complete comprehensibility of the Austrian theory transposes the multitude of 
errors from theoretical towards the factual realm, one who became as real as 
possible. Therefore, things can be seen either in black or white. White is 
represented by the Austrian libertarians, while the mainstream interventionists 
occupy the black segment. A middle solution does not exist as gray is nowhere to 
be found in the color palette that describes the economic sphere. This could be 
explained by the fact that the necessary change must be a radical one, capable to 
reform the foundations of the dominant economic system from 1920 up until today. 
Being such a vast and alive subject, our further challenge consists of the attempt to 
model some of the indicators that act as a warning signal for Austrian economists, 
namely interest rate, inflation etc.  
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